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Abstract. Central nodes are critical in establishing structural connectivity
in a complex network. Attacking such nodes can create real havoc in a com-
plex system. We propose attack strategies based on four types of centers,
namely betweenness center, degree center, median, and center. We study the
vulnerability of synthetic as well as real-world networks in these center-based
attacks. These attacks are node-removal attacks which involve identifying the
central node set and removing them from the network. We observed that the
attacks based on recalculated network information are more efficient than ones
based on initial network information. This work shows that the median-based
attack, which is a novel strategy proposed in this work, is highly destructive
in real as well as synthetic networks. Complex networks, Vulnerability, Graph
theory, Center-based attacks, Recalculated attacks.
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1. Introduction
Analysis and prediction of behavioural dynamics of complex systems require
a thorough study of their underlying network structures. Real-life networks like
biological networks handle a massive amount of data. Such big-data networks are
becoming larger and complex over time. And so are the tools for modelling and
analyzing them. Network science is one of those scientific disciplines which has
been emerged by converging the commonalities in many multi-disciplinary research
fields. It is a highly specialized as well as an inter-disciplinary subject. One way
for studying real networks is by modelling approximate structures. Graph theory
enables such a modelling. The well-studied theories and methods in graph theory
can aid in the mathematical description of large and complex networks. Network
analysis has found new directions with the incorporation of graph-theoretic concepts
in such studies and the advent of complex network theory.
Network security is an all-time relevant research topic. Security threats on com-
plex networks can be either random or targeted. An attacker can either remove or
default a functioning node or edge in the network. In targeted attacks, the attacker
needs to identify the potential nodes/edges in the network and destroy them. Based
on the type of entity being attacked we can term the attacks as node-targeted or
edge-targeted attacks. Analyzing attack vulnerability in synthetic networks (net-
work models) can give insights into how real-world networks behave in such attacks.
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Such studies are highly recommendable while designing robust and error-tolerant
networks. While studying vulnerability, it is always desirable to compare the be-
haviour of synthetic and real-world networks. Here arise the need for a uniform
metric for network vulnerability. Size of the largest connected component (LCC)
in the network can be considered as one such metric. In this paper, we focus on
the vulnerability of synthetic as well as real-world networks in center-based attacks.
Center-based attacks are node-removal attacks which involve identifying the central
node set in the initial network and removing them from the network. Four types
of centers are considered here. They are
(1) Betweenness center BC
(2) Center C
(3) Degree center DC and
(4) Median M
First, we present a roadmap of the related works in vulnerability analysis of complex
networks (Section 2). Familiarisation of the terminologies associated with this study
(Section 3) follows. The attack strategy is defined in Section 4. In the following
section (Section 5) we analyse the robustness of synthetic networks. The network
models considered here are:
(1) Random Network - Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) model
(2) Small-world Network - Watts-Strogatz model
(3) Scale-free Network - Baraba´si-Albert model
In the next section (Section 6) we analyse the vulnerability of real-world networks.
The networks are chosen from different domains areas. They are
(1) Collaboration Network - Network Science co-authorship network [34]
(2) Literature Network - Les Miserables co-appearance network [26]
(3) Airport Network - US popular airports connection network [13]
(4) Biological Network - Protein interaction network in Yeast [25]
2. Related Works
Research in vulnerability analysis of complex networks has been particularly
active during the last decade. Albert et al. in 2000 [1] studied the error and
attack tolerance of complex networks. In this work, they observe that scale-free
networks show an unexceptionally high level of robustness. At almost the same
time, Holme et al. (2002) [23] observed that the behaviour of real-world networks
towards node-attacks was very much different from that of network models. There-
fore they suggest that there might be other structural phenomena which contribute
to the behaviour of real networks in attacks. Motter and Lai (2002) [30] studied the
security threat to complex networks by the cascade of failures due to intentional
attacks. Their findings underline that many real-world networks which are natu-
rally heterogeneous (and survive random attacks) are in fact highly prone to such
cascading failures. Later Motter himself proposed a strategy for defending such
attacks in heterogeneous networks [31] in 2004. Following these findings, Crucitti
et al. in their work [12] introduced a model which depicts that attack on a single
node is sufficient to destroy the efficiency of the entire network.
Attack vulnerability is also an indication of many structural and dynamic fea-
tures of networks. Goldshtein et al. [19], in 2004, studied the hierarchy of complex
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networks based on its vulnerability measures. Thus the quantification of vulnera-
bility measures turns out to be of relevance in network analysis. Boccaletti et al., in
2007, proposed measures to quantify the multiscale evaluation of vulnerability [6].
Mishkovski et. al. [29], in 2011, proposed a metric for vulnerability measurement.
This metric was based on average edge betweenness.
Investigations on the behaviour of complex networks towards different types of
attacks flourished recently. One notable contribution among them is the node-
removal strategy proposed by Bellingeri et al. (2014) [7]. They observed that
the efficiency of strategies depends very much on the network topology. Another
closely related contribution is by Nie et al. (2015) [35] in which they proposed
two new attack strategies based on both degree and betweenness. They found that
these strategies were highly efficient than traditional ones based on degree alone.
Attack strategies based on paths were introduced recently. Pu and Cui (2015) [36]
proposed attack strategies based on longest paths and observed that homogenous
networks are fragile in this category of attacks. Another most recent work in this
regard is the shortest path-attacks proposed by Hao et al. (2016) [21]. They found
that small world models are highly robust towards such attacks.
During each iteration of an attack, the network attributes undergo tremendous
changes. The initial network attributes may no more remain invalid. Therefore
after each iteration of attack, it is desirable to recalculate the network measures
based on which the attack is proposed. In 2002, Holme et al. (2002) [23] observed
that the attack strategies based on recalculated information are more harmful than
the strategies based on initial information. While investigating the identification of
vital nodes in complex networks, Lu et. al. [27] also noticed that the strategies based
on adaptive recalculation are more efficient than the straightforward methods.
Real-world networks are mostly weighted networks. Vulnerability analysis of
weighted networks is a new area of research. Bellingeri and Cassi, in their new
paper [8] (2017), focus on the change in efficiency of attacks due to weights in the
networks. Their work suggests that the vulnerability analysis without considering
the weighted structure of networks could be at times misleading.
3. Terminology
3.1. Graph distances and centers. Two vertices u and v in a graph G are said
to be adjacent if there is an edge (u, v) joining u and v. The order of G is defined
as n = |V | and size of G as m = |E|. Distance between two vertices u and v in a
graph, denoted by d(u, v) is the length of a u− v geodesic (shortest path between
u and v).
Eccentricity and center: Eccentricity of a vertex v on G is defined as
EG(v) = max
u∈V
dG(u, v)
where dG(u, v) is the length of a shortest u− v path in G. A center vertex
is a vertex with minimum EG(v). The set of all center vertices is the center
set of G and is denoted by C(G) [9].
Betweenness and betweenness center: Betweenness of vertes v in G de-
noted by BG(v) or simply B(v) may be defined as
B(v) =
∑
s,t∈V (G)\{v}
σst(v)
σst
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where σst(v) denotes the number of shortest s-t paths passing through v and
σst, the number of shortest s-t paths. The betweenness center of a graph G
is a vertex with minimum BG(v). The set of all betweenness center vertices
is the betweenness center set of G and is denoted by BC(G) [17].
Remoteness and median: Remoteness of vertex v onG is defined asDG(v) =∑
u∈V dG(u, v) where dG(u, v) is the length of a shortest u − v path in G.
A median vertex is a vertex with minimum DG(v). The set of all median
vertices is the median set of G and is denoted by M(G) [9].
Degree and degree center: Degree of vertex v on G, δ(v), is the number of
edges incident to the vertex v. Degree center of a graph G is a vertex with
maximum δ(v). The set of all degree center vertices is the degree center set
of G and is denoted by DC(G).
Graph center and median represent global centers of the graph; whereas a degree
center can be considered as a local center. Another center considered in this study
is the betweenness center, which is related to the geodesics in the graph. To get
an insight into the relevance of graph distances in complex networks see [18] and
refer [40] for more details on center notions in complex networks.
3.2. Network models. Theoretic network models studied by mathematicians are
mostly random models. But in reality, networks behave in a crucially different
manner than random networks. Small-world and scale-free networks are two fun-
damental models capturing specific architectural features of real networks.
3.2.1. Random networks. The classical model is the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model (E-R model)
proposed in [16]. Degree distribution in E-R graphs is binomial which becomes Pois-
son when n is very large (n → ∞). The probability of occurance of a vertex with
degree k in E-R network is given by P (k) ≈ e−k δkavk!
3.2.2. Small world networks. Small world problem was first investigated by Mil-
gram in his pioneer work [28]. He observed that an acquaintance chain between
any two people is always embedded in a small-world structure (maximum six peo-
ple). Most complex networks exhibit smaller diameter. The diameter dia increases
logarithmically with the size of the network. i.e. dia ≈ logn as n → ∞ [15]. The
most acclaimed model in this regard is the W-S model proposed by Watts and
Strogatz in [39].
3.2.3. Scale free networks. This model characterizes the dynamicity of an evolving
network. Baraba´si and Albert [2] proposed B-A model with scale-free property.
This property states that degree distribution is characterized by power-law: P (k) ∝
k−γ with γ > 1. Evolution of such a model is governed by the law of preferential
attachment. By this law, the newly added nodes prefer to connect with nodes of
higher degree (hubs). Thus the degree of hub nodes continuously increases with the
addition of new nodes.
4. Center-based attack: Strategy
We propose center-based attacks on complex networks in which targeted entities
are the different centers as defined in Section 3. Given a network N , first step of
the strategy is to identify the node sets in the descending level of their centrality
(BC/ C/ DC/ M) in N . An attack is performed by removing all nodes in each
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identified set and the edges incident on them from N . The damage caused to N
in each attempt of node removal is calculated in terms of the size of the largest
connected component LCC in the updated N . In the next iteration, the node
set with next higher centrality is attacked. In order to enable the comparison of
different networks, we use a normalized value LCC ′ [21] defined as LCCN where N
is the size of the initial network. The attack iterations terminate when the network
is completely destructed (when LCC ≤ 3). The proposed attack strategies are:
(1) Initial betweenness center attack IB
(2) Initial center attack IC
(3) Initial degree center attack ID and
(4) Initial median attack IM
These strategies are purely based on the information of the initial network. To
achieve more efficient results, it is desirable to follow an approach based on the
recalculated information. In such an approach, the central node set is re-identified
in the LCC after each attack iteration and removed in the next iteration. The
attacks based on recalculated centrality measures are named as follows:
(1) Recalculated betweenness center attack RB
(2) Recalculated center attack RC
(3) Recalculated degree center attack RD and
(4) Recalculated median attack RM
The strategy is depicted in Algorithm 1 and the following flowchart (figure 1).
Algorithm 1 Center-based attack strategy
Initial Condition: Network G with n nodes and largest connected component
LCC
Terminal Condition: Disconnected Network
1: Identify the central node set in L, Cen(LCC)
2: Remove all nodes in Cen(LCC) from G.
3: Find the current largest connected component and update LCC
4: Determine if Size(LCC) ≤ 3. If true, terminate; else go to step 1
5. Vulnerability analysis of synthetic networks
Now we analyse the vulnerability of different network models towards center-
based attacks. Many algorithms exist for generating network models (Refer [3,5,14,
32,38] for details). We used Pajek software [10,11] (Batagelj, V., Mrvar, A.: Pajek
- Program for Large Network Analysis.) for generating different network models.
Random networks were generated using E-R model with Poisson distribution, small
world networks using W-S model and scale-free networks using B-A model. The
size of networks considered were 500 with average vertex degree of 6. When the
networks generated were disconnected; we extracted the giant component alone
from the network for our experiments. Therefore the ultimate aim of the attacks
was the complete destruction of the initial giant component of the network.
After constructing the networks using generative models, trials of attacks based
on the initial network information (IM, IC, IB, ID) were carried out. The change
in LCC ′ was analysed against the fraction of nodes removed in the attacks f and
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Network G, with largest connected component LCC
Identify the central node
set in LCC, Cen(LCC)
Remove all nodes in
Cen(LCC) from G
Update
LCC
Size(LCC) ≤ 3?
End
yes
no
Figure 1. The flow diagram of center-based attack
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
f
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
LC
C
'
Number of nodes=500, Average degree=6
Random Network
Small World Network
Scale-free Network
(a) IM Attack
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
f
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
LC
C
'
Number of nodes=500, Average degree=6
Random Network
Small World Network
Scale-free Network
(b) IC Attack
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
f
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
LC
C
'
Number of nodes=500, Average degree=6
Random Network
Small World Network
Scale-free Network
(c) IB Attack
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
f
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
LC
C
'
Number of nodes=500, Average degree=6
Random Network
Small World Network
Scale-free Network
(d) ID Attack
Figure 2. Initial center attacks in different network models.
compared for all the network models described above. See figure 2 for a comparison
of the strategies IM, IC, IB and ID in the synthetic networks. The vulnerability of
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Figure 3. Vulnerability of network models to initial center attacks.
the three network models to different attacks are compared and depicted in figure 3.
Experiments of attacks based on recalculated information were also carried out
as per the strategy described in Algorithm 1. See figure 4. The comparison of
vulnerability of each network model to different attacks is shown in figure 5.
Damage measurement: Damage caused by attacks based on both initial
and recalculated betweenness center, degree center and median attacks are
all the most comparable. Small world and random models were found to
be equally robust in these attacks while scale-free networks were easily
destructed. Also, in these attacks, networks were completely destructed at
very smaller values of f (≤ 0.6 in initial attacks and < 0.45 in recalculated
attacks) (See figures 2 and 4). But the response of networks towards C
attack was very much different. The networks could withstand the IC
attacks up to f = 0.9 and RC attacks up to f = 0.7. In this case, also scale-
free networks were more vulnerable. Small world networks were completely
destructed at comparatively larger f (≈ 0.9 for initial attacks and ≈ 0.6
for recalculated attacks). See figures 2b and 4b. However, the tolerance
of random models was found to be much better in the case of recalculated
attacks (f ≈ 0.7). (See figure 4b)
Efficiency of attacks: Among the initial center attacks, IB attacks are more
efficient in small world and random networks. See figures 3a and 3c. In
the case of recalculated attacks, all three models are more vulnerable to
RB and RM attacks in an almost equal fashion. See figures 5a, 5c, 5b.
Among them scale-free networks are the weakest (f < 0.30 in initial at-
tacks and f < 0.20 in recalculated attacks). Comparatively, the C attack
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Figure 4. Recalculated attacks in different network models.
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Figure 5. Vulnerability of network models to recalculated attacks.
is less efficient. All recalculated attacks are obviously more efficient than
initial attacks.
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Change in LCC’: For a given value of f , LCC ′ is very small in scale-
free networks compared to small world and random networks (See fig-
ures 5a, 5c, 5b). This shows that the scale-free networks are less robust
than other two models.
Network destruction: IM , IB, RM and RB attacks follow the almost
same rate of network destruction. But in RM attack there is a quick and
drastic destruction (reduction in LCC ′) after a threshold value whereas the
other three attacks follow a gradual destruction mode (See figures 2 and 4).
Summary: The general observation was that attacks based on median and be-
tweenness are highly hazardous. The efficiency of attacks based on recalculated cen-
ters is more than the efficiency of those based on initial network centers. In synthetic
networks, the efficiency of attacks was found to be ordered as IB ≥ IM ≥ ID ≥ IC
in the case of initial attacks and RM ≥ RB ≥ RD ≥ RC in the case of recalculated
attacks. The most efficient attack among them is RM . Among the three network
models considered here, the scale-free networks were found to be highly vulnera-
ble towards center-based attacks. This is because there exist a larger number of
important vertices in scale-free networks as observed by Albert et.al. in [1]. They
observed that scale-free networks are more sensitive towards node-removal attacks
than random or small-world models. Our finding also conforms to this statement.
6. Vulnerability analysis of real-world networks
6.1. Network Science Collaboration Network. NetScience network is a coau-
thorship network; an undirected network with 1589 nodes and 2742 edges. The
dataset was downloaded from Newman’s page [34]. Nodes in the network represent
scientists working on network science. Two nodes are connected if the correspond-
ing scientists have co-authored a publication.
Cytoscape 3.5.0 [37] was used for visualization of the network. Network statistics
were obtained using the Network Analyzer [4] of Cytoscape. After generating the
network we extracted the giant component from it as we focus on the connected
network only. Usually, the second largest component in a real complex network is
very smaller than the largest (giant) component. This is a characteristic feature
of a collaboration network as research will work only if the research community
is highly connected [33]. In our experiment we consider the giant component of
NetScience network which consisted of 379 nodes and 914 edges. A summary of
statistics of the giant component of NetScience network is shown in Appendix:
Table 1. We analysed the change in LCC ′ against f in center-based attacks on the
giant component of NetScience network. See figure 6. The findings are summarised
below:
• Initial center attacks like IM , IB and ID destructs NetScience network
in almost same fashion. IC attacks are least efficient among initial value
attacks.
• The network is highly sensitive to RM and RB attacks (f < 0.04) and
highly robust towards IC attack.
• Also, the network is completely destroyed at very lower values of f . Even
the least efficient attack (IC) destroys the network by removing a mere 20
percent of nodes.
10 LEKHA ET.AL.
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
f
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
LC
C
'
Network Science Collaboration Network (379 nodes, 914edges)
IM
IC
IB
ID
(a)
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
Number of Attacks
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
LC
C
'
Network Science Collaboration Network - N=379, E=914
RM
RC
RB
RD
(b)
Figure 6. Initial and recalculated attacks in NetScience network.
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Figure 7. Initial and recalculated attacks in LesMise´rables network.
6.2. Les Miserables Coappearance Network. This co-appearance network dataset
was compiled by Knuth [26] to represent the co-occurrences of characters in Vic-
tor Hugo’s famous novel Les Mise´rables. In this undirected network, each node
represents a character of the novel and each edge represents the co-occurrence of
two characters in the same chapter. For a summary of statistics of LesMise´rables
network see Appendix: Table 2. The vulnerability of LesMise´rables network was
analysed by running Algorithm 1 and calculating LCC ′ in each iteration. The plot
LCC ′ vs. f is shown in figure 7. The findings are summarized below:
• LesMise´rables network is most sensitive to RM attack. Complete network
is destroyed by removing only 0.1 fraction of nodes.
• Least efficient attack on the network is by IC (f slighlty greater than 0.6)
• Among recalculated attacks, the network shows more robustness towards
RD attack.
6.3. US Popular Airport Network. This is an undirected network of 500 most
popular US airports. The dataset was compiled and used by Colizza et. al. in
2007 [13]. The nodes represent airports and edges represent the air traffic between
them. Hereafter the network is called as US Airport network. See Appendix: Ta-
ble 3 for a summary of statistics of US Airport network. After running Algorithm 1
on US Airport network we analysed the change in LCC ′ against f . See figure 8.
The observations from the experiment are as follows:
• US Airport network is more sensitive to RM and RB attacks.
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Figure 8. Initial and recalculated attacks in US Airport network.
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Figure 9. Initial and recalculated attacks in Yeast Protein Inter-
action network.
• The network shows more robustness to IC attack.
6.4. Yeast Protein Interaction Network. The biological network considered in
this study is the protein interaction network for the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae.
This data set was used by Jeong et. al. in their paper [25]. The nodes represent
proteins and edges represent protein-protein interaction. The actual network con-
sists of 2114 nodes and 2277 edges. But here we extracted and used only the giant
component (of 1458 nodes) for our study. See Appendix: Table 4 for a summary of
statistics of the giant component of Yeast Protein Interaction network. See figure 9
for the plot LCC ′ vs. f during center-based attacks on Yeast Protein Interaction
network. The findings are as follows:
• Attacks on Yeast Protein Interaction network are comparable to those on
NetScience network. Like the latter network, it is more sensitive to RM
and RB attacks with network destroyed at very small values of f (≈ 0.04).
• This network also shows more robustness to IC attack like all other net-
works.
Summary: The efficiency of attacks in real-world networks was found to be as
IB ≈ IM ≈ ID > IC in the case of initial center attacks and RM > RB >
RC or RD in the case of recalculated center attacks. Among the recalculated
attacks, the collaboration network and literature network shows more robustness
towards RD attack while air-transport network and biological network are highly
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tolerant towards RC attack. Among the different real-world networks considered
here the robustness of collaboration network was found to be highly weak.
7. Conclusion
We proposed center-based attack strategies and analysed the tolerance of dif-
ferent synthetic and real-world networks towards these attacks. Network attacks
based on betweenness center and degree center were studied in detail in papers
like [12, 20, 22–24, 29]. However, comparison of network attacks based on different
centers is a naive approach. The attacks based on center and median are seldom
found in the literature. An important milestone of this study is the introduction
of median-based attack. Attacks based on median are found to be highly efficient
among other center-based attacks. Nodes with higher median value are those with
minimum total distance in the network. Therefore identifying and removing such
nodes increase the value of geodesics in the network and in turn induce heavy
damages to the network structure.
Future Scope An interesting follow-up to this work is to study network surviv-
ability in center-based attacks. Robustness of a network can be analysed more
accurately by accounting for weights in the network. This also opens up a new
direction for further follow-up investigation.
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Appendix
Table 1. Statistical parameters: Giant component of NetScience
network
Network Parameter Value
Number of authors with collaborations (Node Count) 379
Number of connected components (ncc) 1
Shortest distance between farthest authors (Diameter) 17
Shortest distance between closest authors (Radius) 9
Number of connected author-pairs (Shortest paths) 143262
Expected distance between two connected authors (Characteristic
path length)
6.042
Average Number of co-authors (Average degree) 4.823
Average chance of collaboration between co-authors (Clustering
coefficient)
74.12%
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Table 2. Statistical parameters: LesMise´rables network
Network Parameter Value
Number of characters in the novel (Node count) 77
Number of connected components (ncc) 1
Shortest distance between farthest characters (Diameter) 5
Shortest distance between closest characters (Radius) 3
Number of connected character-pairs (Shortest paths) 5852
Expected distance between two connected characters (Character-
istic path length)
2.641
Average number of co-appearing characters (Average degree) 6.597
Average chance of co-appearance between co-appearing characters
(Clustering coefficient)
57.313%
Table 3. Statistical parameters: US Airport network
Network Parameter Value
Number of airports (Node count) 500
Number of connected components (ncc) 1
Shortest distance between farthest airports (Diameter) 7
Shortest distance between closest airports (Radius) 4
Number of connected airport-pairs (Shortest paths) 250500
Expected distance between two connected airports (Characteristic
path length)
2.999
Average number of directly connected airports(Average degree) 11.896
Average chance of direct connection between airports connected
to one airport (Clustering coefficient)
61.357%
Table 4. Statistical parameters: Giant component of Yeast Pro-
tein Interaction network
Network Parameter Value
Number of proteins (Node count) 1458
Number of connected components (ncc) 1
Shortest distance between farthest proteins (Diameter) 19
Shortest distance between closest proteins (Radius) 11
Number of connected protein-pairs (Shortest paths) 2124306
Expected distance between two interacting proteins (Characteris-
tic path length)
6.812
Average number of directly interacting proteins (Average degree) 2.672
Average chance of interaction between proteins interacting with
same protein (Clustering coefficient)
70.83%
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